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1. INTRODUCTION 
HE question of ‘regionalism,’ defined broadly as preferential trade 
agreements among a subset of nations, is a longstanding one. As with all 
great issues, economists have long been divided on the wisdom of such 
arrangements. So have policymakers. 
The question of customs unions (CUs) and free trade areas (FTAs), both 
permitted under GATT Article XXIV, has long been a major topic of theoretical 
research. The focus, however, since Jacob Viner’s (1950) classic treatment of it, 
distinguishing between trade diversion and trade creation, has been on showing 
that CUs and FTAs were not necessarily welfare-improving, either for member 
countries or for world welfare. That is, the case for preferential trade 
arrangements was different from the case for free trade for all. The latter, 
enshrined in Adam Smith and Ricardo, and rigorously proven later by 
Samuelson (1939), Kemp (1972), and Grandmont and McFadden (1972), is a 
first-best case. The former, by contrast, reflects second-best considerations and 
was argued by Lipsey and Lancaster (1 956-57), Lipsey ( 1  957), Meade ( I  956), 
Johnson (1958a and 1958b) and others.’ 
The recent revival of regionalism, which I describe as the Second 
Regionalism in contrast and because it is a sequel to the First Regionalism of the 
1960s, raises anew these old questions about trade diversion. But the 
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historically-changed situation which has resurrected regionalism, the context in 
which it must be analyzed, has raised several new issues. 
In this paper, I address these manifold questions, dividing the analysis into a 
discussion of 
Article XXIV of the GATT which sanctions CUs and FTAs (Section 2); 
the First Regionalism, briefly reviewing the factors that led to it and the 
reasons why, in the end, it failed (Section 3); 
the Second Regionalism, the reasons for its revival and its differential 
prospects (Section 4); 
the key issues that this renewed Regionalism raises, distinguishing among 
two main questions (Section 5); 
the first, relating to the static impact-effect of regional trade blocs (Section 
6); and 
the second, concerning the dynamic time-path that regionalism offers, in 
itself and vis-a-vis multilateralism when the objective is to reach 
(nondiscriminatory) free trade for all, so that one asks whether 
‘multilateralism is the best way to get to multilateralism’, distinguishing 
therefore between ‘process-multilateralism’ and ‘outcome-multilateralism’ 
(Section 7). 
2. ARTICLE XXIV AT THE GATT: RATIONALE 
The principle of nondiscrimination is central to the final conception of the 
GATT, signed on October 30, 1947 by representatives from 23 countries in 
Geneva. Article I embodies the strong support for nondiscrimination, requiring 
(unconditional) MFN for all GATT members. 
Aside from ‘grandfathering’ provisions, the only significant exception to 
MFN is made in Article XXIV which permits CUs and FTAs and therefore 
sanctions preferential trade barrier reductions among a subset of GATT members 
as long as they go all the way to elimination.’ 
It is an intriguing question as to why Article XXIV was accepted; and it is a 
question that also has significance for some of the issues raised by the Second 
Regionalism. When you think about it, it is a bit odd that an exception to MFN 
should be allowed as long as it is total (going all the way to 100 per cent) rather 
than partial (say, 20 per cent preference for one’s favoured friends). In fact the 
* Two points should be noted. First, there is a difference between intention and reality: as argued 
below, the Article XXIV - sanctioned FT’As and CUs have never gone ‘all the way.’ Second, 
GATT’s MFN is universal only for its members, so it falls short of total universalism. But the 
important point to remember is that the GATT is open to membership to all who meet the criteria 
for admission and has generally been inclusive rather than exclusive. 
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post-Vinerian theory of preferential trade areas suggests that 100 per cent 
preferences are less likely to increase welfare than partial  preference^.^ 
The rationale for Article XXIV’s inclusion in the GATT therefore must be 
explained in other ways. Perhaps, there was an inchoate, if strong, feeling that 
integration with 100 per cent preferences somehow was special and consonant 
with the objective on multilateralism. Thus, Kenneth Dam (1970, pp. 274-75) 
quotes the prominent US official Clair Wilcox as follows: 
A Custom union (with 100% preferences) creates a wider trading area, 
removes obstacles to competition, makes possible a more economic allocation 
of resources and thus operates to increase production and raise planes of 
living. A preferential system (less than 100%) on the other hand, retains 
internal barriers, obstructs economy in production, and restrains the growth of 
income and demand. . . . A customs union is conducive to the expansion of 
trade on a basis of multilateralism and nondiscrimination; a preferential 
system is not. 
Wilcox’s statement was little more than assertion, however. But the rationale 
for inclusion of Article XXIV in the GATT appears to have been threefold, as 
follows. 
9 Full integration on trade, that is, going all the way down to freedom of trade 
flows among any subset of GATT members, would have to be allowed since 
it created an important element of single-nation characteristics (such as 
virtual freedom of trade and factor movements) among these nations, and 
implied that the resulting quasi-national status following from such 
integration in trade legitimated the exception to MFN obligation toward 
other GATT members. 
The fact that the exception would be permitted only for the extremely 
difficult case where all trade barriers would need to come down, seemed to 
preclude the possibility that all kinds of preferential arrangements would 
break out, returning the world to the fragmented, discriminatory 
bilateralism-infested situation of the 1930s. . One could also think of Article XXIV as permitting a supplemental, 
practical route to the universal free trade that GATT favoured as the 
ultimate goal, with the general negotiations during the many Rounds 
leading to a dismantling of trade barriers on a GATT-wide basis while 
deeper integration would be achieved simultaneously within those areas 
Of course, this theory developed afkr the incorporation of Article XXIV into the GATT. So, its 
inconsistency with Article XXIV, on its own terms, is only an amusing observation perhaps. Note, 
however, that James Meade was a main actor in both. The argument is developed in two 
alternative ways in Lipsey (1960, p. 507) and in Johnson (1967, p. 203). 
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where politics permitted faster movement to free trade under a strategy of 
full and time-bound commitment. This is an argument that is now at centre 
stage: is regionalism truly a building, rather than a stumbling, bloc towards 
multilateral free trade for all; in other words, will it fragment, or integrate, 
the world economy? 
The clear determination of 100 per cent preferences as compatible with 
multilateralism and nondiscrimination, and the equally firm view that anything 
less was not, meant that when Article XXIV was drafted, its principal objective 
was to close all possible loopholes by which it could degenerate into a 
justification for preferential arrangements of less than 100 per cent. Paragraphs 4 
through 10 of Article XXIV were written precisely for this purpose. But, as is 
now commonly conceded, their inherent ambiguity and the political pressures 
for approval of substantial regional groupings of preferences of less than 100 per 
cent have combined to frustrate the full import of the original desire to sanction 
only 100 per cent preferences. 
Dam’s (1970, p. 290) overall judgement is perhaps too harsh but it is certainly 
in the ballpark: 
The record is not comforting. . , . Perhaps only one of the more than one 
dozen regional arrangements that have come before the GATT complied fully 
with Article XXIV criteria. That was the recent United Kingdom/Ireland Free- 
Trade Area, and even in that case certain doubts were expressed before the 
working party. In some cases, the regional arrangements were very wide off 
the mark. The European Coal and Steel Community, covering only two major 
product lines, could not even qualify for the special regional-arrangement 
waiver of Article XXIV10 but required a general waiver under Article 
XXV5. The New Zealand/Australia Free-Trade Agreement, although not 
purportedly an example of ‘functional integration,’ provided for the 
liberalization of an even smaller percentage of intermember trade. A strong 
tendency has also been manifested for interim agreements to provide for 
an even longer transitional period and to contain increasingly fewer 
detailed commitments for eventual completion of the customs union or free- 
trade area. 
3. THE ‘FIRST REGIONALISM’: FAILURE IN THE 1960s 
In any event, one can correctly assert (based on the acceptance of Article 
XXIV into the GATT) that regionalism, in the shape of (100 per cent) customs 
unions and free trade areas, was not generally considered, by the architects of the 
GATT or by the United States, which was the chief proponent of multilateralism 
and nondiscrimination, as antithetical to the GATT and to these principles. 
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1. Nonetheless, the United States, long suspicious of discriminatory trade 
arrangements, restrained itself from resorting to Article XXIV. The formation of 
the European Community in 1958 marked a partial watershed. The United States 
put its shoulder to the wheel and saw the Common Market through, negotiating 
around the different hoops of Article XXIV, emasculating the Article somewhat 
so as to seek GATT approval of an imperfect union (especially in regard to 
discriminatory preferences for the eighteen ex-colonies in Africa which the 
Europeans insisted on retaining, and which required a waiver of GATT rules), all 
in the cause of what it saw as a politically beneficial union of the original six 
nations that formed the Community. But despite the enthusiasm of many to 
follow the EC with a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and even a 
Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA), centred on the United States, nothing came of 
it: The United States remained indifferent to such  notion^.^ 
2. There was an outbreak of FTA proposals in the developing countries as 
well. While stimulated by the European examples, they were motivated by the 
altogether different economic rationale formulated by Cooper and Massell 
(1965a and 1965b), Johnson (1965) and Bhagwati (1968). This was that, given 
any targeted level of import-substituting industrialisation, the developing 
countries, with their small markets, could reduce the cost of this industrialisation 
by exploiting economies of scale through preferential opening of markets with 
one another.s By the end of the 1960s, however, the attempts at forming regional 
free trade areas and customs unions along these lines had also collapsed. The 
problem was that, rather than use trade liberalisation and hence prices to guide 
industry allocation, the developing countries attempting such unions sought to 
allocate industries by bureaucratic negotiation and tie trade to such allocations, 
putting the cart before the horse and killing the forward motion. 
Thus, while the world was indeed filled in the 1960s with proposals for 
NAFTA, PAFTA, LAFTA (the Latin American Free Trade Area), and ever more, 
until one could be forgiven for imagining that a veritable chemical revolution 
had broken out, regionalism had virtually died by the end of the decade, except 
for the original European Community and E R A .  
~~~~~ ~ 
.I Japan probed, in fact, the possibility of going into such an arrangement with the United States as 
one of its partners in the 1960s but to no avail. 
The question of ‘multilateralism’ versus ‘regionalism’ surfaced at a different level even within 
this preferential trade liberalisation among the developing countries. Thus, in the early 1960s. we 
were discussing whether the Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati argument should not be 
considered on a G-77-wide basis rather than for much smaller groups of developing countries. This 
was the main issue before a 1962 UNCTAD Expert Group in New York, of which I was a 
member, which met over three weeks to draft the recommendation that preferential trade 
liberalisation among the developing countries be ‘multilateral,’ i.e. G-77-wide, rather than 
narrowly-focused. Unfortunately, the preferential arrangements that were contemplated took the 
latter, narrower focus. 
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4. THE ‘SECOND REGIONALISM’: REVIVAL IN THE 1980s 
But regionalism (i.e. preferential trade liberalisation) is now back. Those who 
do not know the history of the First Regionalism are doomed to extrapolate from 
the current political ferment in favour of FTAs and CUs and assume uncritically 
that regionalism is here to stay. Those who know the history may make the 
reverse mistake of thinking that regionalism will fail again. 
I believe that careful analysis of the causes of the resurrection of regionalism 
suggests that regionalism is likely to endure this time. The main driving force for 
regionalism today is the conversion of the United States, hitherto an abstaining 
party, to Article XXIV. Beginning with the FTA with Israel (a reflection of the 
special relationship between the two nations and hence of little general value), 
the FTA with Canada marked a distinct change. Now, the NAFTA is being 
negotiated with Mexico, and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative envisages 
more FTAs with the nations of South America, with Chile at the head of the line. 
The conversion of the United States is of major significance. As the key 
defender of multilateralism through the postwar years, its decision now to travel 
the regional route (in the geographical and the preferential senses 
simultaneously) tilts the balance of forces away at the margin from 
multilateralism to regionalism. 
This shift has taken place in the context of an anti-multilateralist ethos that has 
reflected alternative but nonetheless eventually reinforcing views: 
The ‘Memorial Drive’ school6 holds that the GATT is dead (Thurow: 
Davos) or the GATT should be killed (Dornbusch et al., 1989).’ 
Regionalism then is presented in effect as an alternative to multilateralism. 
This school, aptly named in view of its funereal approach to multilateralism, 
has influence in Democratic circles and plays to the prejudices that one 
finds in Congressional circles that mistakenly identify multilateralism with 
America’s postwar altruism and regionalism (with its connotation of 
The MIT economics Department is at 50 Memorial Drive in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I 
obviously exclude Charles Kindleberger, Paul Samuelson and the diaspora, including myself! If 
the views expressed with Dornbusch in a recent Eastman Kodak publication (1989) are a guide, 
Krugman may at times hold one of the positions described above. This pamphlet makes somewhat 
odd and untenable statements about what the GATT does and does not do. Cf. Michael Finger’s 
(1989) rather blunt analysis of these assertions in The World Economy and my own complaints 
about the confusions following from loose writing on trade policy issues, and the resulting 
prostitution of an important debate, in Bhagwati (1991b) The American Enterprise (Nov./Dec. 
1991). Whether the Memorial Drive school has by now shifted under fire its anti-multilateral 
stance and joined the more common view that regionalism is a useful supplement, not an 
alternative, to multilateralism is anyone’s guess, given the conflicting reports one hears of its many 
oral pronouncements on ,  the lecture circuit from its peripetatic members. But if it truly has 
abandoned its early vitriolic anti-GATT positions, I would be delighted in its demise. 
’ I rely upon oral presentation at the 1988 annual meeting of the American Enterprise Institute in 
Washington DC. 
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‘exploiting for ourselves our own markets’) with the presumed current necessity 
to ‘look after one’s interests finally.’ 
An alternative view is that regionalism is a useful supplement, not an 
alternative, to multilateralism. ‘We are only walking on two legs’ 
is the popular argument. That we may wind up walking on all fours is 
ignored. 
It is also often asserted that regionalism will not merely supplement 
multilateralism. It will also accelerate the multilateral process: the threat of 
going (unilateral and) regional will produce multilateral agreements that 
may otherwise be held up. (However, this may be an optimistic view since 
threats that have to be repeatedly implemented, as has been the case with 
US regionalism, are not efficient threats; and they change external 
perceptions about what US trade policy priorities are, quite regardless of 
what the US asserts to be its true intentions. In fact, the taking of two roads 
simultaneously can affect adversely the travel down one, as I argue at length 
below.) 
The panic over the continuing payments deficit has also fed demands for 
‘quick’ results on trade (although the two issues are broadly delinkable: 
payment surpluses and deficits are macro-economic phenomena that are not 
influenced in any predictable way by trade policy changes whose impact on 
the difference between domestic savings and investment, if any, can come in 
different ways that can go in opposed directions). Associated with this has 
been impatience with the pace of the multilateral trade-negotiating process 
and the non sequitur (examined below) that regionalism necessarily works 
faster. 
In addition, Europe 1992 and impending integration of Eastern Europe into 
the European Community have reinforced, the way the formation of the 
Common Market did with many three decades ago, those in North America 
who feel that a countervailing bloc must be formed there as well. Indeed, 
the fear that European investments would be diverted to Eastern Europe, 
once it is integrated with the European Community, was cited by President 
Salinas of Mexico as a factor decisively pushing him toward the Mexico-US 
FTA: this would, he felt, enable Mexico to get the needed investment from 
America and Japan. 
There are strong noneconomic, political and cultural factors also driving 
Mexico toward a free trade area with its northern neighbour. Just as the 
Turks since Ataturk have tried to seek a European rather than an Arab 
identity, the Mexicans clearly seek now an American future rather than one 
with their southern neighbours. The Hispanic (economic) destiny that many 
in America fear from illegal immigration and integration with Mexico has 
its flip side in the American (economic) destiny that Mexico’s reforming 
elite, trained in the top universities in the United States, hopes for. 
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The offer in June 1990 by President Bush to get more nations from South 
America to join the United States in a free trade area, as part of a general 
package of economic initiatives to assist these nations, is reflective of the 
compulsions that the debt crisis there imposes on American policy to 
respond in a regional framework to ensure that this crisis remains 
manageable and does not engulf the United States, whose banks are 
principally endangered by it. 
Then again, the response of South American nations to the prospect 
of FTAs with NAFTA, and in some cases with one another first and 
then joining up with NAF“TA, has been enthusiastic. This time around, 
the prospects are better than in the 1960s. Quite simply, there is now 
a marked shift in economic thinking towards trade liberalisation and 
market forces. The macroeconomic crisis of the 1980s has fed the 
movement to microeconomic reforms, much as it is doing currently 
in India. The changed economic and political attitudes are comforting to 
those of us who went into the trenches to fight these battles as early as the 
1960s. It is also amusing to see those who dismissed our arguments as 
‘reactionary’ or ‘ideological’ then, now embracing these ideas and policies 
and the leaders who are implementing them, with no apologies to us 
and with a facade of independently-obtained wisdom. But frankly, it is good 
to have them finally on the right side; and it is good to have been in the 
right. 
Finally, the conjunction of the two dramatic events, Europe 1992 and the 
US-Canada Free Trade Arrangement, even though fortuitous and prompted 
by different motivations and historical circumstances, certainly has created 
a sense elsewhere that regionalism is the order of the day and others must 
follow suit. In the Far East, for instance, there has been a sense that a Japan- 
centred regional bloc may be necessary in a bloc-infested world, and 
Malaysia has actively sought a Japan-centred Asian bloc to rival and 
confront the US-led Americas’ bloc. 
5. REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM: KEY QUESTIONS 
In the light of the above one suspects therefore that the Second Regionalism 
will endure: it shows many signs of strength and few points of vulnerability. But, 
if so, those of us who see virtue in a rule-based, open and multilateral trading 
system must ask searching questions as to its compatibility with such 
discriminatory trading arrangements. In particular, two major questions must be 
answered: . Is the immediate impact-effect of such preferential trade blocs, whether CUs 
or FTAs, to reduce rather than increase world welfare? 
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0 Regardless of the immediate impact-effect, will regionalism lead to 
nondiscriminatory multilateral free trade for all, through continued 
expansion of the regional blocs until universal free trade is reached, or will 
it fragment the world economy? And will, in any event, such a dynamic 
time-path show that regionalism will get us closer to the goal of multilateral 
free trade for all than multilateralism as the process of trade negotiation 
will? 
I shall now treat each of these two important, and distinct (if at times 
analytically interrelated), questions in turn. 
6. THE STATIC IMPACT-EFFECT QUESTION 
The question of the static impact-effect of preferential trade arrangements 
such as FTAs and CUs is, quite simply, the question raised by Viner (1950): 
would not such discriminatory arrangements be trade-diverting rather than trade- 
creating?’ 
It is important to raise this question because, as Viner taught us, FTAs and 
CUs are two-faced: they liberalise trade (among members), but they protect 
(against outsiders). The important issue therefore is: which aspect of an FTA or 
CU is dominant? Or, to put it in the economist’s language: is a particular FTA or 
CU trade-diverting (that is, taking trade away from efficient outside suppliers 
and giving it to inefficient member countries) or trade-creating (that is, 
generating trade from one more-efficient member at the expense of another less- 
efficient member)? 
Sadly, one may scan the op.ed. articles, the editorials, and the Congressional 
testimony when the renewal of fast-track authority for the extension of NAFTA 
to Mexico was being debated last year, looking for references to trade diversion 
- and find scarcely any. Astonishingly, it was not just the politicians and 
lawyers for Mexico’s lobby who equated the FTA with (nondiscriminatory) free 
trade; reputed economists did so too. 
What can we say about this issue? In particular, what can we propose to 
ensure that, if CUs and FTAs are to flourish, they do not become trade- 
diversionary? Article XXIV’s injunction not to raise the CU’s or FTA’s average 
external tariff can be interpreted as a precaution against trade diversion and harm 
to outside GATT members, though (as argued below) this is not a satisfactory 
way to do it. 
* Defined in Vinerian fashion, a trade-diverting FTA can still improve a member country’s welfare 
but will generally harm outside countries. The focus below is on the impact on others, as is 
presumably the intention also of Article XXIV’s injunction not to raise the average external tariff. 
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In essence, there are three approaches to containing the fallout of trade 
diversion from CUs and FTAs. 
a. Converting Preferential CUs and FTAs into (Geographically) Regional 
Blocs: 
It is occasionally argued that we should encourage geographically-proximate 
countries to form CUs and FTAs, discouraging geographically distant countries 
from doing so since the latter would be more likely to be trade-diverting. This is 
a misguided prescription in my view, for several reasons. 
To see this, it must be first appreciated that it rests on a syllogism. The first 
premise is that a CU or FTA is more likely to create trade and thus raise welfare, 
given a country's volume of international trade, the higher is the proportion of 
trade with the country's CU or FTA partners and the lower is this proportion 
with the nonmember countries. The second premise is that countries sharing 
borders, or closer geographically to one another, have higher proportions of 
trade with one another than countries which are further apart. 
The first premise is, of course, well known to trade economists from the early 
post-Vinerian theory, as developed by Lipsey ( 1958). But Lipsey 's argument 
focuses on the relative sizes of imports from each source vis-a-vis expenditure 
on domestic goods as the key and decisive factor in determining the size of 
losses and gains from the preferential cuts in trade barriers. 
While the likelihood argument is valid within the Lipsey model, it must be 
noted that it is only that. Thus, for specific CUs and FTAs, the actual welfare 
effects will depend, not merely on the trade and expenditure shares ci la Lipsey 
but also on the substitution at the margin between commodities. Thus, for 
instance, the substitution between nonmember goods and domestic goods may 
be very high, so that the costs of discrimination would tend to be high as well, 
ceteris 'paribus. In short, it is important to guess at substitution elasticities 
among goods as well as trade shares, with and between members and 
nonmembers of CUs and FTAs, to arrive at a better picture of the likely effects 
of specific CUs and FTAs that may be proposed. 
As for the second premise, I have problems with that too, as a policy 
guideline. If I had access to captive research assistance and funds, I could 
examine whether, for all conceivable combinations of countries and distances 
among them, and for several different time periods, the premise is valid. As I do 
not, I must rely on casual empiricism and a priori arguments. Compare for 
instance the trade through the 1960s between India and Pakistan with that 
between India and the UK or the USSR. The former trade has been smaller than 
the latter. Borders can breed hostility and undermine trade, just as alliances 
among distant countries with shared causes can promote trade (Gowa and 
Mansfield, 1991). The flag follows trade; and trade equally follows the tlag 
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which, at least in the 19th century European expansion, was not directly across 
from the European nations’ borders. Again, even if the premise is statistically 
valid for any set of observations, it may be a result of trade diversion itself 
proximity may have led to preferential grant of concessions such as OAP and 
GSP at the expense of countries elsewhere. 
In short, prescriptions to confine CUs and FTAs only to geographically 
proximate countries are not defensible because both premises have problems: the 
former is, at best, a likelihood proposition that should not be applied to specific 
situations where the welfare impact depends critically on other variables as well, 
whereas the latter does not have a firm empirical or conceptual basis. 
But possibly the most damaging criticism that one can make of such a 
prescription is that it concentrates, at best, on the static impact-effect question 
and ignores the more important dynamic time-path question. By prescribing that 
we must rule out ‘distant’-country unions, as between the US and Israel or Chile, 
we would make the CUs and FTAs more exclusive and less open to new 
members, undercutting the objective of moving speedily towards the shared 
objective of (nondiscriminatory) multilateral free trade for all. That would be 
tragic indeed. 
b. Designing Disciplines to Minimise Trade Diversion 
A different, and my preferred, approach is, not to pretend to find rules of 
thumb to exclude CUs and FTAs ‘likely’ to be trade-diversionary, but rather to 
examine the different ways in which trade diversion could arise and then to 
establish disciplines that would minimise its incidence. 
Article XXZV. In a sense, Article XXIV (paragraph 5) seeks to do this by 
requiring that CUs, which must have a common external tariff, should ensure 
that this common tariff ‘shall not on the whole by higher or more restrictive than 
the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable . . . 
prior to the formation of such a union.’ For FTAs, the rule is that the ‘duties and 
other regulations of commerce’ are not to be ‘higher or more restrictive’ than 
those previously in effect. 
Evidently, when tariffs change, as in CUs, and some increase and others fall, 
the scope for skullduggery arises again, since Article XXIV leaves the matter 
wholly ambiguous, As Dam (1970, p. 2 17) has noted: 
these ambiguities plagued the review by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to 
the EEC Treaty of Rome - The Six, having used an arithmetic average, 
refused to discuss the best method of calculation, because in their view 
paragraph 5 did not require any special method. 
Besides, it is evident to trade economists that maintaining external tariffs 
unchanged is, in any event, not the same as eliminating trade diversion. What 
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can be said is that, the lower the external barriers, the less is the scope for 
diverting efficient foreign supplies to member countries. Thus, a desirable 
discipline to impose on CUs and FTAs would be to require, for Article XXIV 
sanction, that one price to be paid must be the simultaneous reduction of the 
external tariff (implicit and explicit), pro rata to the progressive elimination of 
internal trade barriers. 
Possible ways of ensuring this may be indirect disciplines. One way would be 
to modify Article XXIV to rule out FTAs with diverse tariffs by members9 and to 
permit only CUs with common external tariffs. With most tariffs bound, this 
would ensure that for the most part a substantial downward shift in tariffs would 
be a consequence - that, say, Argentina or Brazil would be lowering her trade 
barriers, not that the United States would be raising hers. Since regionalism is 
probably going to be a matter of low-trade-barrier hubs such as the United States 
and Japan joining with their respective regional spokes, this insistence on CUs 
could perhaps produce excellent results. 
An alternative, surer way would be to insist on CUs but also to write into 
Article XXIV the requirement that the lowest tariff of any union member on an 
item before the union must be part of the common external tariff of the union. 
Articles VI and X I X :  AD and VERs. But none of this is enough today. For, the 
trade economists who work in a sustained way on the problems of the world 
trading system are aware that protection today takes the form of unfair capture of 
fair trade mechanisms such as Anti-Dumping (AD) actions and of Voluntary 
Export Restraints (VERs). Thus, countries today have access to selective and 
elastic instruments of protection.'O Given this reality, even the modification of 
Article XXIV, to ensure that the external (implicit and explicit) tariff barriers 
come down as a price for CUs to be allowed under GATT rules, will leave open a 
big, gaping hole that would be tantamount to an open invitation to trade diversion 
by these preferential arrangements. In fact, trade creation can degenerate rapidly 
into trade diversion, when AD actions and VERs are freely used. Let me explain. 
Imagine that the United States begins to eliminate (by outcompeting) an 
inefficient Mexican industry once the FTA goes into effect. Even though the 
most-efficient producer is Taiwan, if the next-efficient United States 
outcompetes the least-efficient Mexico, that would be desirable trade creation 
(though the best course would be free trade so that Taiwan would take more of 
the Mexican market instead). 
But what do you suppose the Mexicans would be likely to do'? They would 
probably start anti-dumping actions against Taiwan, which would lead to 
In any event, by encouraging rules of origin because the trade-barrier walls everywhere are not 
equally high, FTAs encourage in turn the bureaucratic-cum-industry capture of the essentially 
arbitrary 'local content' rules for protectionist purposes. 
I" VERs are evidently selective by countries. AD actions are selective down to the level of the 
finn, as Brian Hindley has noted. 
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reduced imports from Taiwan as the imports from the United States increased, 
leaving the Mexican production relatively unaffected. Trade diversion from 
Taiwan to the United States would have occurred. Similarly, the effect of 
Mexican competition against the United States could well be that the United 
States would start anti-dumping actions and even VERs against Taiwan. 
My belief that FTAs will lead to considerable trade diversion (because of 
modem methods of protecticn, which are inherently selective and can be 
captured readily for protectionist purposes) is one that may have been borne out 
in the EC. It is well known that the EC has used anti-dumping actions and VERs 
profusely to erect Fortress Europe against the Far East. Cannot much of this be a 
trade-diverting policy in response to the intensification of internal competition 
among the member states of the EC?" 
Two conclusions follow. (1) If inherently discriminatory regionalism is to 
flourish, as seems likely, then we need greater discipline for AD actions and 
VERs: Article VI needs reform and Article XIX needs compliance alongside the 
elimination of VERs (as the Dunkel draft on the MTN recommends). (2) This 
also implies that regionalism means, not the redundancy of the GATT, but the 
need for a stronger GATT. Those who think of the two as alternatives are 
prisoners of defunct modes of thinking, based on the days when protection was a 
different beast. 
c. Judging Trade-Diversion Case by Case 
While the foregoing analysis embraces a set of policy-framework and 
incentive-creating reforms to minimise trade diversion, an alternative approach 
to the problem could be in terms of a case-by-case approach where the approval 
by the GATT of a proposed CU or FTA would depend on the evaluation of its 
trade-creating and trade-diverting effects and the requirement that the net 
anticipated effect be trade-creating. 
John McMillan (1991) has argued this in an ingenious paper'* which proposes 
a simple test of admissibility: 'does the bloc result in less trade between member 
countries and outsider countries?' Based on the welfare economics of customs 
union theory, this is an aggregative test and has therefore some obvious 
analytical problems. It is also subject to the problem of computing plausible 
trade outcomes. It is hard enough to apply it ex- post; ex ante, as a test of 
admissibility, I see little prospect of its being effectively used to exclude any 
proposed CU or FTA. 
' I  Brian Hindley and Patrick Messerlin are investigating this hypothesis for the GATT Secretariat 
as part of a set of studies to support the 1992 GATT Annual Report on Regionalism and 
Mitltilateralism, following the I991 Annual Report on Trade arid the En\ wonment. ' 
I: This paper has also been commissioned by the GATT Secretariat for its 1992 Annual Report, 
ihid.. 
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Its main merit is its apparent simplicity and its better grounding in economic 
theory. Therefore, I endorse the advisability of some version of the McMillan 
test replacing in Article XXIV the current requirement not to raise the average 
external tariff. But I see it as doing little in practice to avoid trade diversion. For 
this, we will have to rely on changing the incentive structure, including the use 
of suitable constraints imposed by stricter discipline on selective and elastic 
targeting of foreign suppliers. The issue of constraining trade-diversion from 
proliferating preferential groupings is so important that it may not be a bad idea 
to combine the proposals made by the present author and McMillan, rather than 
to treat them as alternatives. 
7. THE DYNAMIC TIME-PATH QUESTION 
The question of the dynamic time-path is particularly difficult: it is almost 
virgin territory. Perhaps the theoretical approach to customs union theory that 
appears to be most relevant to this problem is that of Kemp and Wan (1976). In 
contrast to the Vinerian approach, Kemp and Wan make the external tariff 
structure endogenously determined for the CU such that it improves the CU 
members’ welfare while maintaining the outsiders’ welfare unchanged. This 
restores the pre-Vinerian intuition that a CU should be welfare-improving. The 
problem with the operational significance of the Kemp-Wan argument is that it is 
really an existence argument, without any structure being put on it within the 
context of a specific model so that we can develop intuition about what the 
external tariff structure for such a Kemp-Wan CU would be.I3 But, that any 
subset of countries could form an unambiguously (world-) welfare-improving 
union is definitely established by Kemp and Wan. 
This also implies that the time-path to multilateral free trade for all as the 
optimum optimorum can be made monotonic.I4 But what it does not say is that 
the union will necessarily expand and, if so, in a monotonically welfare- 
improving manner. For that answer, we must turn to the incentive structure that 
any CU provides to relevant ‘groups’ for further expansion of the CU. 
The incentives in question need not be economic incentives. In fact, it is hard 
to imagine that the arbitrary groupings of countries that seek FTAs and CUs are 
dependent on economic arguments as their key determinants. Often, politics 
seems to drive these choices of partners, as in the case of the EC, and now in the 
case of FTAs throughout the Americas. This also accounts for the occasional 
non-regionally-proximate choices of partners in such blocs: e.g. US and Israel, 
I 3  Christopher Bliss (1990) has made a valuable stab at this problem recently. 
l 4  Such time-paths are clearly not unique. Thus, for instance, any number of such paths could be 
generated by relaxing the requirement that, at each stage, the nonunion outside countries be left 
only as well off as before the new expansion of the CU. 
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and Pakistan, Iran and Turkey in the early 1960s. But that economic factors 
contribute to the incentives for such blocs to be formed is not implausible. 
Therefore, a meaningful examination of the incentives to form and to expand 
trade blocs will have to be in the new and growing field of political-economy- 
theoretic analysis. I believe that the models within which we investigate these 
issues will have to distinguish among at least three kinds of ‘agents’, which I 
will detail below with illustrations of the kinds of arguments which we would 
find relevant: 
Governments of member countries. Whether a CU will expand or not will 
depend partly on the willingness of the CU authorities to do so. This will be 
affected by ideas and ideology. Here I worry that CUs will be under pressure not 
to expand because one possible reaction to a CU will be: ‘we are already a large 
market, so what do we really stand to gain by going through the hassle of adding 
more members?’ This is what I call the Our Market Is Large Enough syndrome. 
I think, as Martin Wolf has often noted, that large countries tend to be more 
inward-looking for precisely this type of reason. 
In addition, the expansion of the CU to include any specific set of outside 
countries will imply differential aggregate-welfare effects for current members, 
implying in turn differential incentives for member countries for and against the 
expan~ion.’~ In this context, a CU (which generally includes transfers among 
members) may be more expansionary (h  la Kemp-Wan argumentation) than an 
FTA. though a CU that simultaneously seeks political integration may be less 
willing to expand. 
Interest Groups in members countries. We need also to consider how interest 
groups, who lobby for or against CU expansion, will behave. Again, since CUs 
are a balance of trade-creating and protecting forces, it is possible that the 
protectionists who profit from the diversion of trade away from efficient 
suppliers abroad to themselves will line up against CU expansion to include 
those suppliers. The problem then would be the These Are Our Markets 
syndrome. 
It is a sentiment that was beautifully expressed by Signor Agnelli of Fiat: ‘The 
single market must first offer an advantage to European companies. This is a 
message we must insist on without hesitation.’I6 It is, of course, fine for Signor 
Agnelli to express such sentiments: after all, Fiat has run for years, not on gas, 
but on VERs against the Japanese. But should economists also embrace such 
sentiments? 
Interest Groups and Governments of Outside Countries. The third set of 
‘agents’ has to be the outside countries. Here, the example of a CU may lead 
I s  This analysis must use the Brecher-Bhagwati (1981) approach to theorising about CUs since it 
relates to analysing the effects of changes in domestic and external policies and parameters on the 
distribution of income and welfare among member states. 
l 6  Quoted by Martin Wolf (1989). 
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others to emulate and seek entry. Else, the fear of trade diversion may 
also induce outsiders to seek entry. If so, this acts as an incentive to expand the 
cu . 
This is clearly an uncharted area that is evidently the most interesting for 
further analysis. I should cite one empirical study, by Edward Mansfield ( 1992) 
which takes trade data for 1850-1965, and estimates an index of ‘power 
distribution’ (reflecting, among other things, trade blocs and economic power 
distribution). When power was centred in hegemons, during periods of British 
and American hegemony, and when there was ‘anarchy’. the world economy 
was relatively liberalised (in the sense that Global Exports/GDP ratio was high); 
when there were a few middle powers, as could happen with trade blocs, the 
result was a smaller ratio of trade to GDP. 
If Mansfield’s analysis is accepted, and if it is considered to be a reasonable 
approximation to the question whether CUs will have expansionist or 
protectionist outlooks (mapping perhaps also into their attitudes to CU 
expansion or stagnation). then the presumption would be that historical 
experience suggests that trade blocs will fragment the world economy, not go on 
to unify it. Of course, history does not always repeat itself. But Mansfield’s work 
certainly suggests caution in place of the gung-ho regionalism that has been 
urged by the Memorial Drive School. 
To conclude, consider the following popular assertions by the regionalists: . regionalism is quicker; 
regionalism is more efficient; and 
regionalism is more certain. 
a. Is Regionalism Quicker? 
The regionalists claim that the GATT is the General Agreement to Talk and 
Talk, whereas regionalism proceeds quicker. But is this really so? 
1, Historically, at least, the First Regionalism failed whereas the GATT 
oversaw the effective dismantling of prewar tariffs in the OECD countries and 
the enlargement of disciplines over NTBs at the Tokyo Round and beyond. A 
little caution, to say the least, is necessary before celebrating regionalism’s 
quickfootedness. 
2. For those who believe that regionalism offers a quick route to effective 
trade liberalisation, Kenneth Dam’s analysis quoted above needs renewed 
attention. There is a world of difference between announcing an FTA or a CU 
and its implementation; and the comparison is not pleasing if you are in the 
regional camp. 
3. As for speed, even the best example of regionalism, the EC, started almost 
four decades ago (1957) and is now into 1992. The ‘transition’ has not therefore 
been instantaneous any more than negotiated reductions of trade barriers under 
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the GATT Rounds. And this too, despite this enormous political support for a 
united Europe. 
4. Take agriculture. The record of regional trade blocs dealing with 
agricultural trade liberalisation is either nonexistent or dismal. The CAP is not 
exactly the EC’s crowning achievement. In fact, if it were not for multilateralism 
(i.e the Uruguay Round and the coalition of Cairns Group that crystallised 
around the MTN), it is difficult to imagine that the process of unravelling the 
CAP could even have begun. 
5 .  The (actual or potential) exercise of the regional option can also affect the 
efficacy of the multilateral one. The unwillingness of the EC to start the MTN in 
1982 and its largely reactive, rather than leadership, role at the Uruguay Round, 
are in some degree a reflection of its being less hungry for multilateralism given 
its internal market size and preoccupations. Then again, is it not evident that, 
were it not for the EC, the capacity of the French (for whose political 
predicament one can only have sympathy, much as one deplores its consequence 
for the willingness to liberalise agriculture) to slow down the reform of the CAP 
and the liberalisation of world agriculture would have been significantly less? 
6. Moreover, if regionalism is available as a realistic option, it will encourage 
exit rather than the seeking of voice and even the manifestation of loyalty to 
multilateralism. 
This may happen at the level of the bureaucrats who wind up preferring 
small-group negotiations among friends (code phrase: ‘like-minded people’) 
to the intellectually and politically more demanding business of negotiating 
with and for the larger community of trading nations. 
Else it may happen that, just as public choice theory ci la Olson tells us in 
regard to the diffusion of consumer losses and concentration of producer 
gains that favour protectionist outcomes, the proponents of regionalism tend 
to be better focused and mobilised (they are often regional ‘experts’ and 
partisans who ally themselves with the preferred policy options of the 
countries whose FTA cause they support) whereas the support for 
multilateralism is often more diffused and less politically effective and 
therefore takes second place when regionalism is on the political scene. 
Then again, regionalism may appeal to politicians since it translates more 
easily into votes: the wooing of the Hispanic voters, by urging them to 
identify with the FTA, was quite evident during the renewal of the fast-track 
authority last year for the NAFTA negotiations with Mexico. 
The support of business groups for multilateralism may also erode with 
regional alternatives because of two different reasons: (i) If one can get a 
deal regionally, where one may have a ‘great deal of trade’, then one may 
forget about the multilateral arena. Thus, if Canada could get the US to 
agree to a fairer operation of the unfair trade mechanisms, (a matter on 
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which many Canadians today feel they were mistaken, with Prime Minister 
Mulroney and Mr. Riesman talking about Americans being ‘thugs’ or like 
‘third world dictators’),” why bother to fight the battles at the Uruguay Round 
where the powerful American manufacturing lobbies, zeroing in with the EC 
against the Far East, seek instead to weaken the GATT rules? (ii) Again, one 
may get better protectionist, trade-diversionary deals for oneself in a 
preferential arrangement than in the nondiscrimjnatory world of the GATT: 
e.g. Mexico’s textile interests should benefit in the NAFTA relative to 
Caribbean and other external competitors in the US market, weakening 
Mexican incentive to push for reform in the MFA forthwith. 
7. Finally, it is true that the free rider problem looks difficult as the number of 
GATT members increases steadily. Yet, recent theoretical work on GATT-style 
trade negotiations (Ludema, 1990) suggests that the free rider problem may not 
be an effective barrier to freeing trade. Moreover, as Finger (1982) has pointed 
out, and as experience of inadequate GSP concessions underlines, developing 
countries have not been able to free ride as much as their exemption from 
reciprocity under S&D treatment would imply: the trade concessions on 
commodities of interest to them have not gone as far as the concessions on 
commodities of interest to other GATT members without such an exemption. 
(Unconditional) MFN does not work in practice as well as it should from the 
free-riders’ perspective! 
b. Is Regionalism More Efficient? 
Occasionally, one finds the regionalists arguing that regionalism is also more 
efficient: it produces better results. A typical argument is that, as part of the 
NAFTA negotiations, Mexico has accepted virtually all the US demands on 
intellectual property (IP) protection. A funny story, told in developing country 
circles, serves to probe this assertion critically: 
Ambassador Carla Hills was on a tour of South America, extolling the virtues 
of Mexico’s ‘capitulation.’ At a dinner in her honour in Caracas, she apparently 
claimed: ‘Mexico now has world-class IP legislation.’ At this point, President 
Carlos Peretz supposedly turned to his left and remarked: ’But Mexico does not 
have a world-class parliament.’ 
The true moral of the story, however, is that, as part of the bilateral quid pro 
qiios in an FTA or CU, weak states may agree to specific demands of strong 
states,’’ in ways that are not exactly optimal from the viewpoint of the economic 
” Those who think that much of Japan-bashing is not prejudiced may want to think about the 
differential and exaggerated reaction in the US to the bumbling and far more innocuous remarks of 
Prime Minister Miyazawa and Speaker Sakarauchi. 
I’ In Mexico’s case, President Salinas’ political stake in getting an FTA with the US is vastly 
disproportionate to President Bush’s. 
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efficiency of the world trading system. In turn, however, these concessions can 
distort the outcome of the multilateral negotiations. 
This may well have happened with TRIPs and TRIMs at the Uruguay 
Round.19 As is now widely conceded among economists, the case for TRIPs for 
instance is not similar to the case for free trade: there is no presumption of 
mutual gain, world welfare itself may be reduced by any or more IP protection, 
and there is little empirical support for the view that ‘inadequate’ IP protection 
impedes the creation of new technical knowledge significantly.” Yet, the use of 
US muscle, unilaterally through Special 301 actions, and the playing of the 
regional card through the NAFTA carrot for Mexico, have put TRIPs squarely 
and effectively into the MTN. 
Again, a distorting impact on the multilateral trade rules from NAFTA 
negotiations can be feared from the fact that, as a price for the latter to be 
accepted by the Congress during the delicate renewal of fast-track authority, the 
US Administration had to accept demands for harmonisation in environment and 
labour standards by Mexico towards US standards. This effectively linked in 
political circles the case for Free Trade with the demands for ‘level playing 
fields’ or Fair Trade (extremely widely interpreted),2’ legitimating these 
demands and weakening the ability of economists and of governments 
negotiating at the GATT (multilaterally for arm’s length Free Trade) to resist this 
illegitimate constraint on freeing trade.’* 
c. Is Regionalism More Certain? 
Much has been made, in the Mexican context, of the argument that the FTA 
will make trade liberalisation irreversible. But something needs to be added 
here: 
GATT also creates commitments: tariffs are bound. (This does not apply to 
concessions made under conditionality, of course, by IMF or IBRD.) 
Mexico is a member, if recent, of the GATT. 
l 9  TRIPs are trade-related intellectual property provisions and TRIMs are trade-related investment 
measures. The weakness of the case for their inclusion in the GATT, at least in the forms 
canvassed by many lobbies, is discussed in Bhagwati (1991a). 
’” It is not surprising therefore that the spokesmen for TRIPs have shifted from utilitarian methods 
of argumentation to ‘rights’: they talk now of ‘theft’ and ‘piracy’. 
?’  That the environmental and labour standards negotiations in NAFTA will be ‘parallel’ rather 
than ‘integrated’ is of no consequence, any more than running the services negotiations parallel to 
other negotiations at the Uruguay Round has been. 
*? The danger posed by the proliferating demands for ‘level playing fields’ or Fair Trade, chiefly in 
the United States but elsewhere too, is extremely serious. It is analysed, and the theoretical 
questions raised by it are noted, in Bhagwati (l992b). The environment issue, in particular, has 
been discussed in this context in the 1991 GATT Annual Report, ihid. 
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Recall Dam (quoted above): Article XXIV is so full of holes in its discipline 
that almost anything goes. Reductions of trade barriers can be slowed down, 
as ‘circumstances’ require, other bindings can be tom up by mutual consent 
(an easier task when there are only a few members in the bloc but more 
difficult under the GATT), etc. 
Recall too that regional agreements have failed (LAFTA) and stagnated 
(ASEAN) as well. The current mood in Canada over NAFTA is sour and the 
MTN looks better in con~equence.~~ The sense however, that the US has let 
Canada down and failed to live by the spirit of the FTA agreements will 
probably not endure. But who knows? 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The question of regionalism is thus both a difficult and delicate one. Only 
time will tell whether the revival of regionalism since the 1980s will have been a 
sanguine and benign development or a malign force that will serve to undermine 
the widely-shared objective of multilateral free trade for all. 
My judgement is that the revival of regionalism is unfortunate. But, given its 
political appeal and its likely spread, I believe that it is important to contain and 
shape it in ways sketched here so that it becomes maximally useful and 
minimally damaging, and consonant with the objectives of arriving at 
multilateral free trade for all. 
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